1998Journal of the Asia Pacific EconomyRequires access

Can trade measures induce compliance with trips?

Revadee Yampoin, William A. Kerr

Open publisher page 14 citations

Abstract

Protection of intellectual property on the Asia‐Pacific Rim is weak. Piracy, counterfeiting and other violations of intellectual property in Asian economies with rising technical capabilities were the primary motivation for developed countries’ insistence on protection for intellectual property being included in the Uruguay Round negotiations. One of the central elements of the new World Trade Organization (WTO) is the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs) whereby all WTO members have committed to strengthening intellectual property protection. Retaliation in the form of trade measures on goods for intellectual property rights violations is the fundamental enforcement mechanism included in the TRIPs agreement. The exact form retaliation will take was, however, left to further negotiations over a five‐year period. This paper examines the retaliation rules available to the WTO and their likely ability to induce compliance with TRIPs’ commitments. The conclusion is that the threat of retaliation on goods is unlikely to be a sufficient deterrent to prevent intellectual property violations. As a result, intellectual property is likely to remain a contentious issue in Asia‐Pacific economic relations.

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What this paper is about

Protection of intellectual property on the Asia‐Pacific Rim is weak. Piracy, counterfeiting and other violations of intellectual property in Asian economies with rising technical capabilities were the primary motivation for developed countries’ insistence on protection for intellectual property being included in the Uruguay Round negotiations. One of the central elements of the new World Trade Organization (WTO) is the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs) whereby all WTO members have committed to strengthening intellectual property protection. Retaliation in the form of trade measures on goods for intellectual property rights violations is the fundamental enforcement mechanism included in the TRIPs agreement. The exact form retaliation will take was, however, left to further negotiations over a five‐year period. This paper examines the retaliation rules available to the WTO and their likely ability to induce compliance with TRIPs’ commitments. The conclusion is that the threat of retaliation on goods is unlikely to be a sufficient deterrent to prevent intellectual property violations. As a result, intellectual property is likely to remain a contentious issue in Asia‐Pacific economic relations.

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Available abstract

Protection of intellectual property on the Asia‐Pacific Rim is weak. Piracy, counterfeiting and other violations of intellectual property in Asian economies with rising technical capabilities were the primary motivation for developed countries’ insistence on protection for intellectual property being included in the Uruguay Round negotiations. One of the central elements of the new World Trade Organization (WTO) is the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs) whereby all WTO members have committed to strengthening intellectual property protection. Retaliation in the form of trade measures on goods for intellectual property rights violations is the fundamental enforcement mechanism included in the TRIPs agreement. The exact form retaliation will take was, however, left to further negotiations over a five‐year period. This paper examines the retaliation rules available to the WTO and their likely ability to induce compliance with TRIPs’ commitments. The conclusion is that the threat of retaliation on goods is unlikely to be a sufficient deterrent to prevent intellectual property violations. As a result, intellectual property is likely to remain a contentious issue in Asia‐Pacific economic relations.

Key concepts: Intellectual property, TRIPS architecture, Enforcement, TRIPS Agreement, Negotiation, International trade, Business, Compliance (psychology)

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