2011•Unpublished venueRequires access

Principal-agent model and risk analysis under asymmetric information condition

Guangming Zhang

Abstract

The paper describes a kind of principal-agent model under asymmetric information condition from actual economic life. Through the analysis on optimal solution of the model, we discover that the risk appetite of the agent has a direct effect on the optimal incentive mechanism and the risk sharing of principal and agent, and also endow a parameter in the incentive contract with new economic presentation.

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Available abstract

Key concepts: Incentive, Principal (computer security), Computer science, Principal–agent problem, Information asymmetry, Economic model, Risk analysis (engineering), Microeconomics