Based on Coal Companies under Agency of Incentive Mechanism of Channel Intermediaries
Lisha Yang
Abstract
Lisha Yang
Abstract
Based on agency theory,coal enterprises in china are discussed in the channel structure the agency problem and its causes,the establishment of expounded the need for incentives for intermediaries,and analyzes the principal-agent incentive model,given the incentive mechanism design framework for the coal companies to provide incentives to develop a reasonable theoretical basis.
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Based on agency theory,coal enterprises in china are discussed in the channel structure the agency problem and its causes,the establishment of expounded the need for incentives for intermediaries,and analyzes the principal-agent incentive model,given the incentive mechanism design framework for the coal companies to provide incentives to develop a reasonable theoretical basis.
Key concepts: Incentive, Intermediary, Principal–agent problem, Agency (philosophy), Business, Mechanism (biology), Agency cost, Principal (computer security)