2012•International Journal of Information Technology and ManagementRequires access

The potential of e-procurement technology for reducing corruption

Arjun Neupane, Jeffrey Soar, Kishor Vaidya

Open publisher page 35 citations

Abstract

This paper discusses a theoretical background for an anti-corruption strategy through the principal-agent theory, and explores the potential of public e-procurement for reducing corruption in public procurement. It explores risk factors of corruption in relation to the roles of government, agent, and briber. The Anti-corruption potential of public e-procurement includes the reduction in monopoly of power, information asymmetry, corruption fees, and corruption services. In the paper we also discuss case study examples from Denmark, Singapore, the Republic of Korea, and the Government of Andhra Pradesh in India. These indicate the potential of e-procurement for greater transparency and efficiency. The discussions suggest that the anti-corruption capabilities of public e-procurement have many benefits, particularly, in terms of enhancing accountability, effectiveness and transparency in government procurement, to combat corruption.

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What this paper is about

This paper discusses a theoretical background for an anti-corruption strategy through the principal-agent theory, and explores the potential of public e-procurement for reducing corruption in public procurement. It explores risk factors of corruption in relation to the roles of government, agent, and briber. The Anti-corruption potential of public e-procurement includes the reduction in monopoly of power, information asymmetry, corruption fees, and corruption services. In the paper we also discuss case study examples from Denmark, Singapore, the Republic of Korea, and the Government of Andhra Pradesh in India. These indicate the potential of e-procurement for greater transparency and efficiency. The discussions suggest that the anti-corruption capabilities of public e-procurement have many benefits, particularly, in terms of enhancing accountability, effectiveness and transparency in government procurement, to combat corruption.

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Available abstract

This paper discusses a theoretical background for an anti-corruption strategy through the principal-agent theory, and explores the potential of public e-procurement for reducing corruption in public procurement. It explores risk factors of corruption in relation to the roles of government, agent, and briber. The Anti-corruption potential of public e-procurement includes the reduction in monopoly of power, information asymmetry, corruption fees, and corruption services. In the paper we also discuss case study examples from Denmark, Singapore, the Republic of Korea, and the Government of Andhra Pradesh in India. These indicate the potential of e-procurement for greater transparency and efficiency. The discussions suggest that the anti-corruption capabilities of public e-procurement have many benefits, particularly, in terms of enhancing accountability, effectiveness and transparency in government procurement, to combat corruption.

Key concepts: Transparency (behavior), Procurement, Language change, Business, Monopoly, Accountability, Government (linguistics), Public economics

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