The Secret of the Atom Bomb
Sheldon M. Novick
Abstract
Sheldon M. Novick
Abstract
In a ''blitzkrieg'' assault, U.S. ground forces still might be outgunned, a situation prompting emphasis on small, battlefield nuclear weapons which have been produced in great numbers. Until the 1950's, however, there was no U.S. nuclear arsenal, government assurances not-withstanding. The deceit about U.S. nuclear weaponry helped lock the U.S. and the Soviet Union into the deadly-arms-superiority competition which has become an entrenched aspect of the policies of both countries.
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In a ''blitzkrieg'' assault, U.S. ground forces still might be outgunned, a situation prompting emphasis on small, battlefield nuclear weapons which have been produced in great numbers. Until the 1950's, however, there was no U.S. nuclear arsenal, government assurances not-withstanding. The deceit about U.S. nuclear weaponry helped lock the U.S. and the Soviet Union into the deadly-arms-superiority competition which has become an entrenched aspect of the policies of both countries.
Key concepts: Battlefield, Nuclear weapon, Lock (firearm), Competition (biology), Soviet union, Government (linguistics), Political science, International trade