Transactions Costs and the Efficient Organization of Production: A Study of Timber-Harvesting Contracts
Keith B. Leffler, Randal R. Rucker
Abstract
Keith B. Leffler, Randal R. Rucker
Abstract
A transaction costs framework is developed to explain the choice between lump-sum and per unit payment provisions in private timber-harvesting contracts. Predictions about which contract type minimizes the transaction costs of presale measurement and contract enforcement and monitoring are derived and tested using private timber sales contracts from North Carolina. The empirical results provide strong support for the transaction costs approach and also reject several predictions from a risk-based model. The transaction costs framework also provides insights into the choice between negotiated and competitive sales procedures.
OpenAlex reports 160 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
A transaction costs framework is developed to explain the choice between lump-sum and per unit payment provisions in private timber-harvesting contracts. Predictions about which contract type minimizes the transaction costs of presale measurement and contract enforcement and monitoring are derived and tested using private timber sales contracts from North Carolina. The empirical results provide strong support for the transaction costs approach and also reject several predictions from a risk-based model. The transaction costs framework also provides insights into the choice between negotiated and competitive sales procedures.
Key concepts: Transaction cost, Payment, Production (economics), Enforcement, Business, Database transaction, Industrial organization, Lump sum