The Vietnam War, 1962–64: The Vietnamese Communist Perspective
Ang Cheng Guan
Abstract
Ang Cheng Guan
Abstract
This article describes the Vietnamese communists' decision-making process, in the period between the conclusion of the International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Crisis in July 1962 and July 1965 when American troops landed at Danang. Using old and recent Vietnamese communist sources, research based on Chinese and Russian documents, and non-communist materials, this article puts the major events of those years in context and shows how Hanoi had hoped to unify the country without having to engage the USA militarily but without success.
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This article describes the Vietnamese communists' decision-making process, in the period between the conclusion of the International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Crisis in July 1962 and July 1965 when American troops landed at Danang. Using old and recent Vietnamese communist sources, research based on Chinese and Russian documents, and non-communist materials, this article puts the major events of those years in context and shows how Hanoi had hoped to unify the country without having to engage the USA militarily but without success.
Key concepts: Vietnamese, Communism, Vietnam War, Political science, Context (archaeology), Settlement (finance), Economic history, Period (music)