2010Unpublished venueRequires access

Pricing of urban rail transit for different operation stages based on Game theory

Zhou Mingbao, Ying Chen, Ning Zhang, Zhang Xiao-jun

Open publisher page 5 citations

Abstract

In order to protect the sustainable and healthy development of urban public transport system, relieve its internal price competition, this paper proposed a ticket pricing model of urban rail transit based on Game theory. Through consideration of different radiation scope under different operation stages, this paper construct rail and bus transit's ticket income models, and by Nash equilibrium got their optimal prices in non-cooperative game. The method can provide a reference for the reasonable and scientific ticket pricing. Finally, through actual engineering validated the operability and effectivity of this method.

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What this paper is about

In order to protect the sustainable and healthy development of urban public transport system, relieve its internal price competition, this paper proposed a ticket pricing model of urban rail transit based on Game theory. Through consideration of different radiation scope under different operation stages, this paper construct rail and bus transit's ticket income models, and by Nash equilibrium got their optimal prices in non-cooperative game. The method can provide a reference for the reasonable and scientific ticket pricing. Finally, through actual engineering validated the operability and effectivity of this method.

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Available abstract

In order to protect the sustainable and healthy development of urban public transport system, relieve its internal price competition, this paper proposed a ticket pricing model of urban rail transit based on Game theory. Through consideration of different radiation scope under different operation stages, this paper construct rail and bus transit's ticket income models, and by Nash equilibrium got their optimal prices in non-cooperative game. The method can provide a reference for the reasonable and scientific ticket pricing. Finally, through actual engineering validated the operability and effectivity of this method.

Key concepts: Ticket, Operability, Urban rail transit, Game theory, Scope (computer science), Nash equilibrium, Public transport, Order (exchange)

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