2010•Unpublished venueRequires access

Reverse supply Chain's incentive analysis under government supervision

Cao Hong-jun, Sha Na, Yuyan Wang

Open publisher page 3 citations

Abstract

This paper studies the incentive mechanism of RSC in government regulation. On the condition of subsidies and punishment being an independent parameters, the government may choose three incentive programs: first is the program of subsidies and punishment simultaneous implementation, second is the program of only punishment, third is the program of only subsidies. We can educe that from the comparison of three different programs, the first program is the optimal incentive program. The results have important theoretical and practical significance to government making-decision of environmental policy. And the results laid the theoretical foundation to further study government and enterprise contracts.

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What this paper is about

This paper studies the incentive mechanism of RSC in government regulation. On the condition of subsidies and punishment being an independent parameters, the government may choose three incentive programs: first is the program of subsidies and punishment simultaneous implementation, second is the program of only punishment, third is the program of only subsidies. We can educe that from the comparison of three different programs, the first program is the optimal incentive program. The results have important theoretical and practical significance to government making-decision of environmental policy. And the results laid the theoretical foundation to further study government and enterprise contracts.

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OpenAlex reports 3 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

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Available abstract

This paper studies the incentive mechanism of RSC in government regulation. On the condition of subsidies and punishment being an independent parameters, the government may choose three incentive programs: first is the program of subsidies and punishment simultaneous implementation, second is the program of only punishment, third is the program of only subsidies. We can educe that from the comparison of three different programs, the first program is the optimal incentive program. The results have important theoretical and practical significance to government making-decision of environmental policy. And the results laid the theoretical foundation to further study government and enterprise contracts.

Key concepts: Subsidy, Incentive, Government (linguistics), Punishment (psychology), Incentive program, Mechanism (biology), Business, Public economics

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