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2013•Estudios De EconomiaOpen access

Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Cournot game

Aitor Ciarreta, Carlos Gutiérrez‐Hita

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Abstract

detección, con una aplicación al juego de Cournot

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detección, con una aplicación al juego de Cournot

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Available abstract

detección, con una aplicación al juego de Cournot

Key concepts: Cournot competition, Collusion, Economics, Oligopoly, Microeconomics, Sustainability, Tacit collusion, Cartel

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