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2015•Oxford University Press eBooksRequires access

Cartels and Collusion

Jay Pil Choi, Heiko Gerlach

Open publisher page 4 citations

Abstract

Abstract This chapter provides a selective review of economic theory and experimental evidence on cartels and collusion. In particular, it highlights the role of incentives in collusion and cartel formation and identifies conditions that are conducive to collusive behavior. It then discusses enforcement against collusion with a particular focus on the recent work on leniency programs and cartel screening. Finally, we look at experimental evidence on cartel formation and the effects of competition policy.

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Abstract This chapter provides a selective review of economic theory and experimental evidence on cartels and collusion. In particular, it highlights the role of incentives in collusion and cartel formation and identifies conditions that are conducive to collusive behavior. It then discusses enforcement against collusion with a particular focus on the recent work on leniency programs and cartel screening. Finally, we look at experimental evidence on cartel formation and the effects of competition policy.

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Available abstract

Abstract This chapter provides a selective review of economic theory and experimental evidence on cartels and collusion. In particular, it highlights the role of incentives in collusion and cartel formation and identifies conditions that are conducive to collusive behavior. It then discusses enforcement against collusion with a particular focus on the recent work on leniency programs and cartel screening. Finally, we look at experimental evidence on cartel formation and the effects of competition policy.

Key concepts: Collusion, Cartel, Incentive, Enforcement, Competition (biology), Industrial organization, Economics, Microeconomics

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