2010Unpublished venueRequires access

Risk-considered Shapley profit allocation of innovative supply chain

Sui Ru-bin, LI Fu-yan

Open publisher page 2 citations

Abstract

The profit allocation is a complex and critical problem in supply chain coordination. In this paper,four models of the traditional non-cooperative game, cooperative game, non-cooperative innovative game and cooperation innovative game of the supply chain consisting a manufacturer and a retailer are discussed. The overall supply chain profits of four models are compared and the conclusion that cooperation innovation can greatly increase the overall supply chain profit is found. The supply chain profit is allocated by using the Shapley value method. The risk-considered Shapley value method is more in line with the actual situation through the introduction of risk adjustment index. A numerical example which can provide reference to the profit allocation of supply chain enterprises shows that the relevant conclusions are correct and scientific.

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What this paper is about

The profit allocation is a complex and critical problem in supply chain coordination. In this paper,four models of the traditional non-cooperative game, cooperative game, non-cooperative innovative game and cooperation innovative game of the supply chain consisting a manufacturer and a retailer are discussed. The overall supply chain profits of four models are compared and the conclusion that cooperation innovation can greatly increase the overall supply chain profit is found. The supply chain profit is allocated by using the Shapley value method. The risk-considered Shapley value method is more in line with the actual situation through the introduction of risk adjustment index. A numerical example which can provide reference to the profit allocation of supply chain enterprises shows that the relevant conclusions are correct and scientific.

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Available abstract

The profit allocation is a complex and critical problem in supply chain coordination. In this paper,four models of the traditional non-cooperative game, cooperative game, non-cooperative innovative game and cooperation innovative game of the supply chain consisting a manufacturer and a retailer are discussed. The overall supply chain profits of four models are compared and the conclusion that cooperation innovation can greatly increase the overall supply chain profit is found. The supply chain profit is allocated by using the Shapley value method. The risk-considered Shapley value method is more in line with the actual situation through the introduction of risk adjustment index. A numerical example which can provide reference to the profit allocation of supply chain enterprises shows that the relevant conclusions are correct and scientific.

Key concepts: Shapley value, Supply chain, Profit (economics), Cooperative game theory, Game theory, Microeconomics, Industrial organization, Computer science

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