1974•The Quarterly Journal of EconomicsRequires access

Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

Mark V. Pauly

Open publisher page 715 citations

Abstract

I. The competitive allocation of insurance under moral hazard, 45. — II. “Competitive” equilibrium, 50. — III. Moral hazard and public provision, 52. — IV. Adverse selection and the competitive market, 54. — V. Alternative devices for dealing with adverse selection and moral hazard from overinsurance, 60.

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What this paper is about

I. The competitive allocation of insurance under moral hazard, 45. — II. “Competitive” equilibrium, 50. — III. Moral hazard and public provision, 52. — IV. Adverse selection and the competitive market, 54. — V. Alternative devices for dealing with adverse selection and moral hazard from overinsurance, 60.

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OpenAlex reports 715 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

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Available abstract

I. The competitive allocation of insurance under moral hazard, 45. — II. “Competitive” equilibrium, 50. — III. Moral hazard and public provision, 52. — IV. Adverse selection and the competitive market, 54. — V. Alternative devices for dealing with adverse selection and moral hazard from overinsurance, 60.

Key concepts: Adverse selection, Moral hazard, Selection (genetic algorithm), Actuarial science, Business, Hazard, Morale hazard, Economics

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