Reducing Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe
Miles Pomper, William C. Potter, Nikolai Sokov
Abstract
Miles Pomper, William C. Potter, Nikolai Sokov
Abstract
Control of US and Russian tactical nuclear weapons has remained an elusive goal since the end of the Cold War, despite the fact that these weapons are particularly attractive to nuclear terrorists and represent a major danger from the standpoint of early or accidental use. Meaningful progress will probably require a larger deal in which there are trade-off between US concessions on issues of interest to Russia and Russian concessions on tactical nuclear weapons. Two options merit serious consideration. The first entails the withdrawal of the small number of US tactical weapons that remain in Europe to jump-start a dialogue. The second option involves a package deal that would include Russian agreement to initiate negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons reductions in exchange for NATO agreement to discuss changes in the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. An optimal approach would be to launch a meaningful dialogue on tactical nuclear weapons in a separate forum, yet in parallel to the next stage of START negotiations.
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Control of US and Russian tactical nuclear weapons has remained an elusive goal since the end of the Cold War, despite the fact that these weapons are particularly attractive to nuclear terrorists and represent a major danger from the standpoint of early or accidental use. Meaningful progress will probably require a larger deal in which there are trade-off between US concessions on issues of interest to Russia and Russian concessions on tactical nuclear weapons. Two options merit serious consideration. The first entails the withdrawal of the small number of US tactical weapons that remain in Europe to jump-start a dialogue. The second option involves a package deal that would include Russian agreement to initiate negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons reductions in exchange for NATO agreement to discuss changes in the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. An optimal approach would be to launch a meaningful dialogue on tactical nuclear weapons in a separate forum, yet in parallel to the next stage of START negotiations.
Key concepts: Nuclear weapon, Arms control, Negotiation, Treaty, Political science, International trade, Cold war, Nuclear strategy