2010Unpublished venueRequires access

Game Analysis on Retail Enterprises Cooperation

Diping Zhang

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Abstract

Since the reform and opening up, China's retail industry is developing rapidly and has become an important component of market economy. With China's accession to WTO, a large number of foreign-invested retail enterprises have entered China, so that the development of China's retail industry is facing more challenges. Based on an analysis on general game model of enterprises cooperation, this article builds Cournot model and Stackelberg model for the main problems of China's retail industry development and does a quantitative analysis on cooperation and non-cooperation game among retail enterprises. The results show that cooperation is a rational choice for China's retail enterprises and also an orientation of development and competition for China's retail enterprises. Regarding this, the article puts forward a few corresponding policy recommendations.

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What this paper is about

Since the reform and opening up, China's retail industry is developing rapidly and has become an important component of market economy. With China's accession to WTO, a large number of foreign-invested retail enterprises have entered China, so that the development of China's retail industry is facing more challenges. Based on an analysis on general game model of enterprises cooperation, this article builds Cournot model and Stackelberg model for the main problems of China's retail industry development and does a quantitative analysis on cooperation and non-cooperation game among retail enterprises. The results show that cooperation is a rational choice for China's retail enterprises and also an orientation of development and competition for China's retail enterprises. Regarding this, the article puts forward a few corresponding policy recommendations.

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Available abstract

Since the reform and opening up, China's retail industry is developing rapidly and has become an important component of market economy. With China's accession to WTO, a large number of foreign-invested retail enterprises have entered China, so that the development of China's retail industry is facing more challenges. Based on an analysis on general game model of enterprises cooperation, this article builds Cournot model and Stackelberg model for the main problems of China's retail industry development and does a quantitative analysis on cooperation and non-cooperation game among retail enterprises. The results show that cooperation is a rational choice for China's retail enterprises and also an orientation of development and competition for China's retail enterprises. Regarding this, the article puts forward a few corresponding policy recommendations.

Key concepts: China, Stackelberg competition, Accession, Business, Cournot competition, Competition (biology), Industrial organization, Game theory

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