Applying authentication tests to discover Man-In-The-Middle attack in security protocols
Shahabuddin Muhammad
Abstract
Shahabuddin Muhammad
Abstract
Authentication protocols ensure that participants in a distributed environment verify their identities before sending sensitive information to each other. If an authentication protocol has a design flaw, it may fail to reveal the true identities of distributed participants. To verify that an authentication protocol achieves its objectives, we have developed Authentication Tests based on Distributed Temporal Protocol Logic (DTPL). In this paper, we propose a generic strategy to analyze authentication protocols based on these Authentication Tests. We demonstrate the ease with which our proposed strategy can be used by applying these tests on famous Needham-Shroeder Public Key (NSPK) authentication protocol. We also demonstrate how the inability to prove a security property can lead us to identifying Man-In-The-Middle attack on such protocols.
OpenAlex reports 2 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Authentication protocols ensure that participants in a distributed environment verify their identities before sending sensitive information to each other. If an authentication protocol has a design flaw, it may fail to reveal the true identities of distributed participants. To verify that an authentication protocol achieves its objectives, we have developed Authentication Tests based on Distributed Temporal Protocol Logic (DTPL). In this paper, we propose a generic strategy to analyze authentication protocols based on these Authentication Tests. We demonstrate the ease with which our proposed strategy can be used by applying these tests on famous Needham-Shroeder Public Key (NSPK) authentication protocol. We also demonstrate how the inability to prove a security property can lead us to identifying Man-In-The-Middle attack on such protocols.
Key concepts: Authentication protocol, Computer science, Challenge-Handshake Authentication Protocol, Authentication (law), Lightweight Extensible Authentication Protocol, Protocol (science), Challenge–response authentication, Data Authentication Algorithm