Empirical Research on Top Management Incentive Mechanism and Performance of Companies
Shao Yan, Ting Lv, Chun Qing Song, Wen Qi Zhu
Abstract
Shao Yan, Ting Lv, Chun Qing Song, Wen Qi Zhu
Abstract
This paper makes an examination on the sensibility between top management incentive mechanism and performance of listed companies by taking data of annual salary of the top management, shareholding ratio and performance of listed companies from 2006 to 2008, adopting systematic and empirical methods to state and analyze the related documents both at home and abroad in combination with the current situation and problems of salary of the top management and shareholding incentive mechanism in China. For the above empirical results, this paper in the end makes some proposes which is referable and instructive for future company rules and project of top management incentive mechanism.
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This paper makes an examination on the sensibility between top management incentive mechanism and performance of listed companies by taking data of annual salary of the top management, shareholding ratio and performance of listed companies from 2006 to 2008, adopting systematic and empirical methods to state and analyze the related documents both at home and abroad in combination with the current situation and problems of salary of the top management and shareholding incentive mechanism in China. For the above empirical results, this paper in the end makes some proposes which is referable and instructive for future company rules and project of top management incentive mechanism.
Key concepts: Salary, Incentive, Mechanism (biology), Empirical research, Business, China, Sensibility, Industrial organization