Religious Symbols in Educational Institutions: Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights
Ivana Radačić
Abstract
Ivana Radačić
Abstract
Abstract The issue of religious symbols in educational institutions has been a source of vigorous legal and political controversy. Two types of cases have been litigated before the European Court of Human Rights: those concerning the wearing of the Islamic headscarf in schools and universities, and those concerning the presence of the crucifix in school classrooms. In this article, I shall analyse these cases, assessing how the Court balances different rights and State interests, focusing in particular on the Court’s interpretation of the principles of neutrality/secularism and of gender equality. I shall criticise the Court’s deference to the State, arguing that it should more strictly supervise how States respect human rights. Respect for human rights requires that the States respect individual’s religious freedoms, be autonomous from the religion and safeguard the principle of plurality. While the Court has proclaimed these principles, it has failed to apply them in these cases.
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Abstract The issue of religious symbols in educational institutions has been a source of vigorous legal and political controversy. Two types of cases have been litigated before the European Court of Human Rights: those concerning the wearing of the Islamic headscarf in schools and universities, and those concerning the presence of the crucifix in school classrooms. In this article, I shall analyse these cases, assessing how the Court balances different rights and State interests, focusing in particular on the Court’s interpretation of the principles of neutrality/secularism and of gender equality. I shall criticise the Court’s deference to the State, arguing that it should more strictly supervise how States respect human rights. Respect for human rights requires that the States respect individual’s religious freedoms, be autonomous from the religion and safeguard the principle of plurality. While the Court has proclaimed these principles, it has failed to apply them in these cases.
Key concepts: Law, Human rights, Secularism, Jurisprudence, Deference, State (computer science), Political science, Fundamental rights