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New US Policy Options for South Asia

James T. Murphy

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Abstract

Since Pakistan and India gained independence in the late 1940s, U.S. policies toward South Asia have shown little consistency. Washington rarely saw the region as important in its own right; rather, the United States tended to treat it as a pawn in the superpower struggle. U.S. strategies were often oriented on a fluctuating single interest, whether it be containment, human rights, humanitarian concerns, or nuclear proliferation. For most of the postwar period, the United States favored Pakistan over India. Changing international circumstances -- the demise of the Cold War, Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, alleviation of superpower rivalry in much of the Third World, and new democratic governments in India and Pakistan -- have given the United States a rare opportunity to restructure its strategy toward and relations with South Asia. The thrust of U.S. policy should be to emulate Soviet "new thinking" by improving ties with major regional states. If done discreetly, an enhanced U.S. relationship with India -- belated recognition of New Delhi's democratic traditions, industrial prowess, nonaligned leadership, and regional primacy -- need not damage ties with Pakistan, might give the United States leverage in abating Indo-Pakistani antagonisms, and could encourage Indian moderation in exercising its perceived prerogatives as the dominant regional power. India is the only country in the area with which the United States can appropriately discuss larger strategic issues. It also is a good example for the Third World of the compatibility of economic growth and a vibrant democracy. Both India and Pakistan are already de facto members of the nuclear club. The United States should openly accept this reality, remove its non-proliferation-related penalties, and thus encourage both nations to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and accept international nuclear safeguards.

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Since Pakistan and India gained independence in the late 1940s, U.S. policies toward South Asia have shown little consistency. Washington rarely saw the region as important in its own right; rather, the United States tended to treat it as a pawn in the superpower struggle. U.S. strategies were often oriented on a fluctuating single interest, whether it be containment, human rights, humanitarian concerns, or nuclear proliferation. For most of the postwar period, the United States favored Pakistan over India. Changing international circumstances -- the demise of the Cold War, Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, alleviation of superpower rivalry in much of the Third World, and new democratic governments in India and Pakistan -- have given the United States a rare opportunity to restructure its strategy toward and relations with South Asia. The thrust of U.S. policy should be to emulate Soviet "new thinking" by improving ties with major regional states. If done discreetly, an enhanced U.S. relationship with India -- belated recognition of New Delhi's democratic traditions, industrial prowess, nonaligned leadership, and regional primacy -- need not damage ties with Pakistan, might give the United States leverage in abating Indo-Pakistani antagonisms, and could encourage Indian moderation in exercising its perceived prerogatives as the dominant regional power. India is the only country in the area with which the United States can appropriately discuss larger strategic issues. It also is a good example for the Third World of the compatibility of economic growth and a vibrant democracy. Both India and Pakistan are already de facto members of the nuclear club. The United States should openly accept this reality, remove its non-proliferation-related penalties, and thus encourage both nations to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and accept international nuclear safeguards.

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Available abstract

Since Pakistan and India gained independence in the late 1940s, U.S. policies toward South Asia have shown little consistency. Washington rarely saw the region as important in its own right; rather, the United States tended to treat it as a pawn in the superpower struggle. U.S. strategies were often oriented on a fluctuating single interest, whether it be containment, human rights, humanitarian concerns, or nuclear proliferation. For most of the postwar period, the United States favored Pakistan over India. Changing international circumstances -- the demise of the Cold War, Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, alleviation of superpower rivalry in much of the Third World, and new democratic governments in India and Pakistan -- have given the United States a rare opportunity to restructure its strategy toward and relations with South Asia. The thrust of U.S. policy should be to emulate Soviet "new thinking" by improving ties with major regional states. If done discreetly, an enhanced U.S. relationship with India -- belated recognition of New Delhi's democratic traditions, industrial prowess, nonaligned leadership, and regional primacy -- need not damage ties with Pakistan, might give the United States leverage in abating Indo-Pakistani antagonisms, and could encourage Indian moderation in exercising its perceived prerogatives as the dominant regional power. India is the only country in the area with which the United States can appropriately discuss larger strategic issues. It also is a good example for the Third World of the compatibility of economic growth and a vibrant democracy. Both India and Pakistan are already de facto members of the nuclear club. The United States should openly accept this reality, remove its non-proliferation-related penalties, and thus encourage both nations to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and accept international nuclear safeguards.

Key concepts: Superpower, Rivalry, Political science, Democracy, Demise, Foreign policy, Development economics, Political economy

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