A unified countermeasure against side channel attacks on cryptographic RFID
Hamad Marzouqi, Khaled Salah, Mahmoud Al‐Qutayri, Chan Yeob Yeun
Abstract
Hamad Marzouqi, Khaled Salah, Mahmoud Al‐Qutayri, Chan Yeob Yeun
Abstract
Side channel analysis attacks have been successfully used to attack embedded systems and cryptographic hardware systems. These attacks have been categorized into different types of attacks yielding to a specific countermeasure for each type based on the nature of the attack. As a result, a significant overhead in terms of performance and resources is introduced by the countermeasures applied to the cryptosystems. Having a unified scheme to counteract different attacks can be challenging. In this paper, we introduce a unified gate-level countermeasure scheme that protects against both power analysis attacks and fault attacks simultaneously. In this paper, we show and study how such a unified countermeasure can be applied to todays cryptographic RFIDs.
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Side channel analysis attacks have been successfully used to attack embedded systems and cryptographic hardware systems. These attacks have been categorized into different types of attacks yielding to a specific countermeasure for each type based on the nature of the attack. As a result, a significant overhead in terms of performance and resources is introduced by the countermeasures applied to the cryptosystems. Having a unified scheme to counteract different attacks can be challenging. In this paper, we introduce a unified gate-level countermeasure scheme that protects against both power analysis attacks and fault attacks simultaneously. In this paper, we show and study how such a unified countermeasure can be applied to todays cryptographic RFIDs.
Key concepts: Countermeasure, Side channel attack, Cryptography, Computer science, Computer security, Cryptosystem, Power analysis, Overhead (engineering)