2011International Conference for Internet Technology and Secured TransactionsRequires access

A unified countermeasure against side channel attacks on cryptographic RFID

Hamad Marzouqi, Khaled Salah, Mahmoud Al‐Qutayri, Chan Yeob Yeun

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Abstract

Side channel analysis attacks have been successfully used to attack embedded systems and cryptographic hardware systems. These attacks have been categorized into different types of attacks yielding to a specific countermeasure for each type based on the nature of the attack. As a result, a significant overhead in terms of performance and resources is introduced by the countermeasures applied to the cryptosystems. Having a unified scheme to counteract different attacks can be challenging. In this paper, we introduce a unified gate-level countermeasure scheme that protects against both power analysis attacks and fault attacks simultaneously. In this paper, we show and study how such a unified countermeasure can be applied to todays cryptographic RFIDs.

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What this paper is about

Side channel analysis attacks have been successfully used to attack embedded systems and cryptographic hardware systems. These attacks have been categorized into different types of attacks yielding to a specific countermeasure for each type based on the nature of the attack. As a result, a significant overhead in terms of performance and resources is introduced by the countermeasures applied to the cryptosystems. Having a unified scheme to counteract different attacks can be challenging. In this paper, we introduce a unified gate-level countermeasure scheme that protects against both power analysis attacks and fault attacks simultaneously. In this paper, we show and study how such a unified countermeasure can be applied to todays cryptographic RFIDs.

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Available abstract

Side channel analysis attacks have been successfully used to attack embedded systems and cryptographic hardware systems. These attacks have been categorized into different types of attacks yielding to a specific countermeasure for each type based on the nature of the attack. As a result, a significant overhead in terms of performance and resources is introduced by the countermeasures applied to the cryptosystems. Having a unified scheme to counteract different attacks can be challenging. In this paper, we introduce a unified gate-level countermeasure scheme that protects against both power analysis attacks and fault attacks simultaneously. In this paper, we show and study how such a unified countermeasure can be applied to todays cryptographic RFIDs.

Key concepts: Countermeasure, Side channel attack, Cryptography, Computer science, Computer security, Cryptosystem, Power analysis, Overhead (engineering)

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