1999•European Journal of MarketingRequires access

Ownership decisions in plural contractual systems

Robert Francis Dahlstrom, Arne Nygaard

Open publisher page 33 citations

Abstract

A substantial body of research employs agency theory and transaction costs analysis to explain ownership decisions in distribution channels. Agency theory identifies factors that prompt firms to favor behavior‐based contracting over outcome‐based agreements. Transaction cost economics is a complementary framework which maintains that the organizational form in a location should be the one that economizes on production and transaction costs. Prior research illustrates that independent variables (e.g. proximity to highways, dedicated assets) outlined in these theories provide a partial explanation for ownership decisions. Nevertheless, scant research has analyzed whether factors outlined in agency theory and transaction cost analysis are employed by executives when making ownership decisions. The purpose of this study is to investigate managerial rationales underlying plural contractual networks.

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What this paper is about

A substantial body of research employs agency theory and transaction costs analysis to explain ownership decisions in distribution channels. Agency theory identifies factors that prompt firms to favor behavior‐based contracting over outcome‐based agreements. Transaction cost economics is a complementary framework which maintains that the organizational form in a location should be the one that economizes on production and transaction costs. Prior research illustrates that independent variables (e.g. proximity to highways, dedicated assets) outlined in these theories provide a partial explanation for ownership decisions. Nevertheless, scant research has analyzed whether factors outlined in agency theory and transaction cost analysis are employed by executives when making ownership decisions. The purpose of this study is to investigate managerial rationales underlying plural contractual networks.

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OpenAlex reports 33 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

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Available abstract

A substantial body of research employs agency theory and transaction costs analysis to explain ownership decisions in distribution channels. Agency theory identifies factors that prompt firms to favor behavior‐based contracting over outcome‐based agreements. Transaction cost economics is a complementary framework which maintains that the organizational form in a location should be the one that economizes on production and transaction costs. Prior research illustrates that independent variables (e.g. proximity to highways, dedicated assets) outlined in these theories provide a partial explanation for ownership decisions. Nevertheless, scant research has analyzed whether factors outlined in agency theory and transaction cost analysis are employed by executives when making ownership decisions. The purpose of this study is to investigate managerial rationales underlying plural contractual networks.

Key concepts: Transaction cost, Plural, Agency (philosophy), Business, Principal–agent problem, Database transaction, Internalization theory, Agency cost

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