Agency Cost Control for the Listed Companies in China
Wei Zu-bin
Abstract
Wei Zu-bin
Abstract
Firstly,the paper analyzes five types of the principal-agent relations and the agency cost that is produced in the listed companies in our country on the basis of the traditional theory of principal-agent, of which the principal-agent relation and the agency cost of country and the agent of the country ownership are typical. Secondly, we propose five ways to control the agency cost in the listed companies.
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Firstly,the paper analyzes five types of the principal-agent relations and the agency cost that is produced in the listed companies in our country on the basis of the traditional theory of principal-agent, of which the principal-agent relation and the agency cost of country and the agent of the country ownership are typical. Secondly, we propose five ways to control the agency cost in the listed companies.
Key concepts: Principal–agent problem, Agency cost, Agency (philosophy), Principal (computer security), Control (management), China, Business, Relation (database)