Research on Knowledge Sharing Game between Logistics Enterprises
Zhongcheng Liu
Abstract
Zhongcheng Liu
Abstract
This paper studies the knowledge sharing between logistics enterprises using related game theory. To simplify the analysis, only two logistics enterprises A and B are considered the game model. To achieve knowledge sharing between enterprises, both enterprises involved in the game model must develop a feasible and optimal strategic combination, the strategic portfolio includes input cost for knowledge sharing and the final knowledge achievement, this paper focuses on the analysis of these two factors: the sharing input cost and the profit sharing ratio. According to game characteristics, basic assumptions, the backward inductive method is adopted to solve the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game model, then the related factors that affect the knowledge sharing between enterprises are analyzed, and learning that knowledge sharing security coefficient is proportional to enterprise’s optimal profit value, and the knowledge sharing mechanism is also affected by the profit distribution proportion.
A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
This paper studies the knowledge sharing between logistics enterprises using related game theory. To simplify the analysis, only two logistics enterprises A and B are considered the game model. To achieve knowledge sharing between enterprises, both enterprises involved in the game model must develop a feasible and optimal strategic combination, the strategic portfolio includes input cost for knowledge sharing and the final knowledge achievement, this paper focuses on the analysis of these two factors: the sharing input cost and the profit sharing ratio. According to game characteristics, basic assumptions, the backward inductive method is adopted to solve the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game model, then the related factors that affect the knowledge sharing between enterprises are analyzed, and learning that knowledge sharing security coefficient is proportional to enterprise’s optimal profit value, and the knowledge sharing mechanism is also affected by the profit distribution proportion.
Key concepts: Stackelberg competition, Knowledge sharing, Profit (economics), Game theory, Knowledge management, Sequential game, Computer science, Portfolio