2014•International Conference on Management Science and EngineeringRequires access

Research on Knowledge Sharing Game between Logistics Enterprises

Zhongcheng Liu

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Abstract

This paper studies the knowledge sharing between logistics enterprises using related game theory. To simplify the analysis, only two logistics enterprises A and B are considered the game model. To achieve knowledge sharing between enterprises, both enterprises involved in the game model must develop a feasible and optimal strategic combination, the strategic portfolio includes input cost for knowledge sharing and the final knowledge achievement, this paper focuses on the analysis of these two factors: the sharing input cost and the profit sharing ratio. According to game characteristics, basic assumptions, the backward inductive method is adopted to solve the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game model, then the related factors that affect the knowledge sharing between enterprises are analyzed, and learning that knowledge sharing security coefficient is proportional to enterprise’s optimal profit value, and the knowledge sharing mechanism is also affected by the profit distribution proportion.

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What this paper is about

This paper studies the knowledge sharing between logistics enterprises using related game theory. To simplify the analysis, only two logistics enterprises A and B are considered the game model. To achieve knowledge sharing between enterprises, both enterprises involved in the game model must develop a feasible and optimal strategic combination, the strategic portfolio includes input cost for knowledge sharing and the final knowledge achievement, this paper focuses on the analysis of these two factors: the sharing input cost and the profit sharing ratio. According to game characteristics, basic assumptions, the backward inductive method is adopted to solve the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game model, then the related factors that affect the knowledge sharing between enterprises are analyzed, and learning that knowledge sharing security coefficient is proportional to enterprise’s optimal profit value, and the knowledge sharing mechanism is also affected by the profit distribution proportion.

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Available abstract

This paper studies the knowledge sharing between logistics enterprises using related game theory. To simplify the analysis, only two logistics enterprises A and B are considered the game model. To achieve knowledge sharing between enterprises, both enterprises involved in the game model must develop a feasible and optimal strategic combination, the strategic portfolio includes input cost for knowledge sharing and the final knowledge achievement, this paper focuses on the analysis of these two factors: the sharing input cost and the profit sharing ratio. According to game characteristics, basic assumptions, the backward inductive method is adopted to solve the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game model, then the related factors that affect the knowledge sharing between enterprises are analyzed, and learning that knowledge sharing security coefficient is proportional to enterprise’s optimal profit value, and the knowledge sharing mechanism is also affected by the profit distribution proportion.

Key concepts: Stackelberg competition, Knowledge sharing, Profit (economics), Game theory, Knowledge management, Sequential game, Computer science, Portfolio

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