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Incomplete Contracts, Collusion and Authority Delegation in Hierarchical Agency
Yutaka Suzuki
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Abstract
Introduction lnlargefirms,duetotheasymmetlyofinfbrmationortheincompletenessofthe infbnnationstmctureandthelimitationofthesetofthccxamtecontractiblevambles resultingfiomtheabovefactoTs,thenhold-upprOblems`'teH1dstooccurduetotheNInternal Oppommismi1．(T1nistypeofopportunismwasatfir百tsuggestedbyOWilIiamson(1975)in theconte9[tofthehiermchyoffirms.)Inpmctice,thisoftentakesthefbrmofthecompetitionfbrthegoodmnkedtask and/OrtheconfIictbetwecndMsions(units)whoactuaIlycmYyoutthetasks,inthestage befbrctheimplementationofthemainpmject． ＨOwtheorganizationmitigatesthis側holdPupprOblem11ori1theconflictamong dMsionsi'andhowthemainpmjectshouldbecarTiedouta1℃vitalfbritssuccess・Indeed， the野calledhigh-perfbTmancefirms(e､9．Toyota,ormolegenemIly,thesuccessfhI managementofthcpmject)dealwiththesepmblemsverywcll・Itisthcpumoseofthis papertoanalyzewheretheesscnseofthisPhenomenonexists、ConcrBtely,itisasfbllows、 SupposethatthepurposeofeachfinnistoenhancetheefYiciency(totalpie)asmuchas possible，Wewouldliketochamcterizetheorganizationstructures(fbrms)astheOptimal solutionstoalleviatethe'１hold-upproblemnorilconflictofintelestsiiinhelmttothc organizationwithincompletecontmcting,giventheexogenousparametersandinfbrmation stTucmres、
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