1998•Review of Economic DesignRequires access
On optimality of illegal collusion in contracts
Ariane Lambert‐Mogiliansky
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Ariane Lambert‐Mogiliansky
Abstract
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Key concepts: Collusion, Principal (computer security), Microeconomics, Agency (philosophy), Interim, Simple (philosophy), Economics, Transaction cost