Taking morality seriously: a defense of robust realism
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Abstract
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Abstract
1. The View, The Motivation, The Book 2. The Argument from the Moral Implications of Objectivity (or Lack Thereof) 3. The Argument from the Deliberative Indispensability of Irreducibly Normative Truths 4. And Now, Robust Metaethical Realism 5. Doing with Less 6. Metaphysics 7. Epistemology 8. Disagreement 9. Motivation 10. Tallying Plausibility Points Bibliography Index
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1. The View, The Motivation, The Book 2. The Argument from the Moral Implications of Objectivity (or Lack Thereof) 3. The Argument from the Deliberative Indispensability of Irreducibly Normative Truths 4. And Now, Robust Metaethical Realism 5. Doing with Less 6. Metaphysics 7. Epistemology 8. Disagreement 9. Motivation 10. Tallying Plausibility Points Bibliography Index
Key concepts: Morality, Realism, Moral realism, Philosophy, Environmental ethics, Psychology, Epistemology, Moral psychology