2019•Zeitschrift für Ethik und MoralphilosophieRequires access

Against Moral Mind-Independence: Metaethical Constructivism and the Argument from Moral Phenomenology

Dennis Kalde

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Key concepts: Moral realism, Constructivism (international relations), Epistemology, Realism, Phenomenology (philosophy), Philosophy, Moral psychology, Philosophical realism

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Against Moral Mind-Independence: Metaethical Constructivism and the Argument from Moral Phenomenology — Research Paper | ScholarLens