Winning Battles but Losing Wars: Three Ways Successes in Combat Promote Failures in Peace

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] RECENT DIFFICULTIES in post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction efforts in both Afghanistan and Iraq stand in stark contrast to the overwhelming successes of their respective maneuver combat operations. While reasons abound for why these problems have arisen, one rationale is still under examined--the methods utilized when conducting direct combat operations. Only by making fundamental changes in military doctrine can these problems be alleviated, thereby increasing the likelihood of success in stabilizing post-intervention states. While the U.S. military has always played a role in post-conflict reconstruction operations during phase IV operations, current rebuilding efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan have been stymied by instability. A resurgent Taliban in southern Afghanistan and increasing opium production raise questions about the effectiveness of U.S. and NATO reconstruction efforts in that country. Reconstruction efforts in Iraq have often stalled because of a dangerous and unpredictable security environment; violence perpetrated by insurgents, militias, cults, foreign terrorists, and profiteering criminals has made the security situation in Iraq untenable. At one point, the Iraqi security environment deteriorated to the point that over two million Iraqis fled their homes and entered neighboring countries. (1) These daunting post-conflict challenges stand in stark contrast to the successes during the maneuver operations (phase III operations) during these two wars. When conventional U.S. military forces began their campaign in Afghanistan in October 2001, Afghanistan's capital, Kabul, fell in only two months, and most major cities in the country fell by the end of the year. During the 2003 invasion of Iraq, it took a mere six weeks to push into and capture Baghdad. Maneuver operations in both conflicts were powerful, quick, and decisive. There is no lack of opinions as to why reconstruction was far more challenging than expected in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some critics point to intelligence failures before the wars began and during reconstruction efforts; others point to underdeveloped and ad hoc approaches to post-conflict reconstruction planning, while still others place the blame on senior leaders of reconstruction efforts. (2) One potential explanation is rarely discussed: the conduct of combat operations before the beginning of reconstruction. Oftentimes discussions of phase III and phase IV operations occur in relative isolation, and we assume the operations are independent of each other. However, these two components of military actions are highly intertwined and interconnected. Is it possible that the way the U.S. military conducts wars makes it harder to achieve long-lasting, peaceful outcomes? I believe that the American way of war, that is, the doctrine followed and tactics used used during phase III operations, creates great difficulties and additional problems to solve during phase IV operations. Methods that are highly successful during the maneuver phase of conflicts directly contribute to increasingly difficult post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Cause and Effect We cannot expect easy post-conflict stabilization operations in our current military operations because of three conditions we either fostered or failed to control. The overwhelming use of force espoused by the Powell Doctrine, the targeting of state infrastructure, and the presence of increasing numbers of foreign nationals, all create problems that continue to plague efforts in reconstruction. I will discuss each of these considerations in turn. Overwhelming use of military force. One of the most common axioms of military action is to use overwhelming force in order to defeat an adversary. (3) A commonly held guideline when planning an offensive operation is to possess a 3:1 advantage in personnel in combat operations and an even greater numeric advantage during military operations in urbanized terrain. …