CERP in Afghanistan: Refining Military Capabilities in Development Activities
Gregory A. Johnson, Vijaya Ramachandran, Julie Walz
Abstract
Gregory A. Johnson, Vijaya Ramachandran, Julie Walz
Abstract
Carl Schramm, president and chief executive officer of the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, published a paper in Foreign Affairs in 2010 entitled Expeditionary Economics, arguing that the economies of Iraq and Afghanistan have shown few signs of progress. Schramm makes the case for the military to engage broadly in midconfiict and postconflict reconstruction using a variety of tools. Economic reconstruction must be a part of a three-legged strategy, following invasion and stabilization. To do reconstruction, the military needs to expand its areas of competence, rid itself of its central planning mentality, and become a more flexible force that can facilitate economic growth while trying to stabilize the regions in which it is engaged.The challenges of implementing expeditionary economics are daunting. The overarching question is whether it makes sense for the military to engage beyond the limited aims of stabilization. In this article, we take a practical view, arguing that the military is already substantially engaged in both stability and development activities in Afghanistan and conflict and postconflict zones, and that we need to figure out ways in which it can do its work more efficiently and effectively. We emphasize that our recommendations do not advocate that the military take over all development activities for the U.S. Government. They are, however, designed to address the military's capacity to carry out what it is already doing in Afghanistan and in in-conflict situations, where the military is playing a significant role because of the security concerns or lack of ability of government entities to carry out development assistance.Emergence of Stability Operations in the MilitaryThe recent doctrinal emergence of stability operations in the military is based primarily on the changing international dynamics that followed the end of the Cold War. Types of U.S. operations radically shifted in the 1990s after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and conclusion of major combat operations in the Gulf War. The military became more engaged in so-called operations than war,1 which included peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, security assistance, counterdrug, and nation assistance missions. Deployments became frequent and diverse and spanned the globe. Moreover, the United States was involved in a stability engagement every 18 to 24 months following die Cold War.2 Nevertheless, the operations outlined in other than war were doctrinally not identified as core missions for the military, and many in the Defense Establishment viewed them as distractions from the military's primary role of preparing for and winning the Nation's wars.A monumental shift in thinking occurred following the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The realization that the attacks materialized from individuals and entities who operated from unstable, weak, and failing states directly led to a strategic security shift in the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS). The 2002 NSS recognized development as a primary security mechanism on par with defense and diplomacy. The aligning of the three Ds of national security raised awareness of the potential that foreign development assistance could have in stabilizing regions and in mitigating terrorism and potential insurgencies.3 Meanwhile, military operations had begun in Afghanistan and would soon begin in Iraq, thrusting the military into operations that would become counterinsurgency engagements. The military incorporated seized Iraqi funds to create a program that was designed to pay for projects that would help stabilize military units' operating areas.4 This program evolved into the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), which was formally initiated in late 2003 using U.S. -appropriated funds for both Iraq and Afghanistan.5 Designed to enhance interagency cooperation, improve stability, and build capacity by working closely with local officials, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were established in Afghanistan and later in Iraq. …
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Carl Schramm, president and chief executive officer of the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, published a paper in Foreign Affairs in 2010 entitled Expeditionary Economics, arguing that the economies of Iraq and Afghanistan have shown few signs of progress. Schramm makes the case for the military to engage broadly in midconfiict and postconflict reconstruction using a variety of tools. Economic reconstruction must be a part of a three-legged strategy, following invasion and stabilization. To do reconstruction, the military needs to expand its areas of competence, rid itself of its central planning mentality, and become a more flexible force that can facilitate economic growth while trying to stabilize the regions in which it is engaged.The challenges of implementing expeditionary economics are daunting. The overarching question is whether it makes sense for the military to engage beyond the limited aims of stabilization. In this article, we take a practical view, arguing that the military is already substantially engaged in both stability and development activities in Afghanistan and conflict and postconflict zones, and that we need to figure out ways in which it can do its work more efficiently and effectively. We emphasize that our recommendations do not advocate that the military take over all development activities for the U.S. Government. They are, however, designed to address the military's capacity to carry out what it is already doing in Afghanistan and in in-conflict situations, where the military is playing a significant role because of the security concerns or lack of ability of government entities to carry out development assistance.Emergence of Stability Operations in the MilitaryThe recent doctrinal emergence of stability operations in the military is based primarily on the changing international dynamics that followed the end of the Cold War. Types of U.S. operations radically shifted in the 1990s after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and conclusion of major combat operations in the Gulf War. The military became more engaged in so-called operations than war,1 which included peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, security assistance, counterdrug, and nation assistance missions. Deployments became frequent and diverse and spanned the globe. Moreover, the United States was involved in a stability engagement every 18 to 24 months following die Cold War.2 Nevertheless, the operations outlined in other than war were doctrinally not identified as core missions for the military, and many in the Defense Establishment viewed them as distractions from the military's primary role of preparing for and winning the Nation's wars.A monumental shift in thinking occurred following the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The realization that the attacks materialized from individuals and entities who operated from unstable, weak, and failing states directly led to a strategic security shift in the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS). The 2002 NSS recognized development as a primary security mechanism on par with defense and diplomacy. The aligning of the three Ds of national security raised awareness of the potential that foreign development assistance could have in stabilizing regions and in mitigating terrorism and potential insurgencies.3 Meanwhile, military operations had begun in Afghanistan and would soon begin in Iraq, thrusting the military into operations that would become counterinsurgency engagements. The military incorporated seized Iraqi funds to create a program that was designed to pay for projects that would help stabilize military units' operating areas.4 This program evolved into the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), which was formally initiated in late 2003 using U.S. -appropriated funds for both Iraq and Afghanistan.5 Designed to enhance interagency cooperation, improve stability, and build capacity by working closely with local officials, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were established in Afghanistan and later in Iraq. …
Key concepts: Military theory, Revolution in Military Affairs, Military science, Competence (human resources), Government (linguistics), Officer, Political science, Variety (cybernetics)