2015•Unpublished venueRequires access

SDR-Based Network Impersonation Attack in GSM-Compatible Networks

Santiago Aragon, F. Kuhlmann, Tania Villa

Open publisher page 12 citations

Abstract

Despite the rapid change in cellular technologies, Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) keep a high percentage of their deployed infrastructure using Global System for Mobile communications (GSM) technologies. With about 3.5 billion subscribers, GSM remains as the de facto standard for cellular communications. However, the security criteria envisioned 30 years ago, when the standard was designed, are no longer sufficient to ensure the security and privacy of the users. Furthermore, even with the newest fourth generation (4G) cellular technologies starting to be deployed, these networks could never achieve strong security guarantees because the MNOs keep backwards- compatibility given the huge amount of GSM subscribers. In this paper, we present and describe the tools and necessary steps to perform an active attack against a GSM-compatible network, by exploiting the GSM protocol lack of mutual authentication between the subscribers and the network. The attack consists of a so-called man-in-the- middle attack implementation. By using Software Defined Radio (SDR), open-source libraries and open- source hardware, we setup a fake GSM base station to impersonate the network and therefore eavesdrop any communications that are being routed through it and extract information from their victims. Finally, we point out some implications of the protocol vulnerabilities and how these can not be mitigated in the short term since 4G deployments will take long time to entirely replace the current GSM infrastructure.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

Despite the rapid change in cellular technologies, Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) keep a high percentage of their deployed infrastructure using Global System for Mobile communications (GSM) technologies. With about 3.5 billion subscribers, GSM remains as the de facto standard for cellular communications. However, the security criteria envisioned 30 years ago, when the standard was designed, are no longer sufficient to ensure the security and privacy of the users. Furthermore, even with the newest fourth generation (4G) cellular technologies starting to be deployed, these networks could never achieve strong security guarantees because the MNOs keep backwards- compatibility given the huge amount of GSM subscribers. In this paper, we present and describe the tools and necessary steps to perform an active attack against a GSM-compatible network, by exploiting the GSM protocol lack of mutual authentication between the subscribers and the network. The attack consists of a so-called man-in-the- middle attack implementation. By using Software Defined Radio (SDR), open-source libraries and open- source hardware, we setup a fake GSM base station to impersonate the network and therefore eavesdrop any communications that are being routed through it and extract information from their victims. Finally, we point out some implications of the protocol vulnerabilities and how these can not be mitigated in the short term since 4G deployments will take long time to entirely replace the current GSM infrastructure.

Why it matters

OpenAlex reports 12 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

Key contribution

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Available abstract

Despite the rapid change in cellular technologies, Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) keep a high percentage of their deployed infrastructure using Global System for Mobile communications (GSM) technologies. With about 3.5 billion subscribers, GSM remains as the de facto standard for cellular communications. However, the security criteria envisioned 30 years ago, when the standard was designed, are no longer sufficient to ensure the security and privacy of the users. Furthermore, even with the newest fourth generation (4G) cellular technologies starting to be deployed, these networks could never achieve strong security guarantees because the MNOs keep backwards- compatibility given the huge amount of GSM subscribers. In this paper, we present and describe the tools and necessary steps to perform an active attack against a GSM-compatible network, by exploiting the GSM protocol lack of mutual authentication between the subscribers and the network. The attack consists of a so-called man-in-the- middle attack implementation. By using Software Defined Radio (SDR), open-source libraries and open- source hardware, we setup a fake GSM base station to impersonate the network and therefore eavesdrop any communications that are being routed through it and extract information from their victims. Finally, we point out some implications of the protocol vulnerabilities and how these can not be mitigated in the short term since 4G deployments will take long time to entirely replace the current GSM infrastructure.

Key concepts: GSM, Service data point, Computer network, Computer science, Customised Applications for Mobile networks Enhanced Logic, Cellular network, Backward compatibility, Base station

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