The Federalism-Rights Nexus: Explaining Why Senate Democrats Tolerate Rehnquist Court Decision Making But Not the Rehnquist Court
Neal E. Devins
Abstract
Open-access reader
Neal E. Devins
Abstract
Open-access reader
decisions of the Rehnquist Court.In Part II, I will demonstrate that lawmakers typically lack the incentives to attack Court decisions limiting Congress's power on federalism grounds.In Part III, I will explain why Senate Democrats nonetheless have good reason to use the Senate's confirmation power as a way to attack the Rehnquist Court.I.
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decisions of the Rehnquist Court.In Part II, I will demonstrate that lawmakers typically lack the incentives to attack Court decisions limiting Congress's power on federalism grounds.In Part III, I will explain why Senate Democrats nonetheless have good reason to use the Senate's confirmation power as a way to attack the Rehnquist Court.I.
Key concepts: Federalism, Political science, Nexus (standard), Law, Roberts Court, New Federalism, Supreme court, Warren Court