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2009•RePEc: Research Papers in EconomicsOpen access

The paradox of performance related pay systems: ‘why do we keep adopting them in the face of evidence that they fail to motivate?’

David Marsden

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Abstract

The paradox of performance related pay systems: 'why do we keep adopting them in the face of evidence that they fail to motivate?

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The paradox of performance related pay systems: 'why do we keep adopting them in the face of evidence that they fail to motivate?

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OpenAlex reports 35 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

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Available abstract

The paradox of performance related pay systems: 'why do we keep adopting them in the face of evidence that they fail to motivate?

Key concepts: Negotiation, Incentive, Set (abstract data type), Outcome (game theory), Face (sociological concept), Pay for performance, Performance-related pay, Line management

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The paradox of performance related pay systems: ‘why do we keep adopting them in the face of evidence that they fail to motivate?’ — Research Paper | ScholarLens