Strategic Substitutes and Complements in Cournot Oligopoly with Product Differentiation
Małgorzata Knauff
Abstract
Małgorzata Knauff
Abstract
We consider Cournot oligopoly with differentiated product. We develop respective sufficient conditions on the inverse demand and cost function thatmake the oligopoly a game of strategic substitutes when goods are substitutes anda game of strategic complementarities when goods are complements. The scope ofthis result is illustrated by examples
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We consider Cournot oligopoly with differentiated product. We develop respective sufficient conditions on the inverse demand and cost function thatmake the oligopoly a game of strategic substitutes when goods are substitutes anda game of strategic complementarities when goods are complements. The scope ofthis result is illustrated by examples
Key concepts: Cournot competition, Oligopoly, Product differentiation, Strategic complements, Microeconomics, Economics, Product (mathematics), Industrial organization