Equilibrium Uniqueness In Oligopoly Games With Strategic Complements
Martin Peitz
Abstract
Open-access reader
Martin Peitz
Abstract
Open-access reader
I show the uniqueness of equilibrium for a class of oligopoly models with strategic complements.Product differentiation models are considered in which the contraction mapping theorem cannotnecessarily be applied.
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I show the uniqueness of equilibrium for a class of oligopoly models with strategic complements.Product differentiation models are considered in which the contraction mapping theorem cannotnecessarily be applied.
Key concepts: Oligopoly, Uniqueness, Strategic complements, Mathematical economics, Economics, Microeconomics, Mathematics, Cournot competition