1999RePEc: Research Papers in EconomicsOpen access

Equilibrium Uniqueness In Oligopoly Games With Strategic Complements

Martin Peitz

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Abstract

I show the uniqueness of equilibrium for a class of oligopoly models with strategic complements.Product differentiation models are considered in which the contraction mapping theorem cannotnecessarily be applied.

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I show the uniqueness of equilibrium for a class of oligopoly models with strategic complements.Product differentiation models are considered in which the contraction mapping theorem cannotnecessarily be applied.

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Available abstract

I show the uniqueness of equilibrium for a class of oligopoly models with strategic complements.Product differentiation models are considered in which the contraction mapping theorem cannotnecessarily be applied.

Key concepts: Oligopoly, Uniqueness, Strategic complements, Mathematical economics, Economics, Microeconomics, Mathematics, Cournot competition

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