Open-Mindedness: An Epistemic Virtue Motivated by Love of Truth and Understanding

Epistemic virtue has been regarded as central to the educational process as far back as Plato. One particular epistemic virtue, open-mindedness (OM), has been touted by philosophers of education as a vital characteristic of the educated mind. In defining OM, both epistemologists and philosophers of education have focused on its role in the pursuit of knowledge, and true belief as a component of knowledge. This focus on knowledge (and truth) is to be expected because epistemology has revered knowledge as the primary epistemic good for centuries. However, recent scholarship in epistemology proposes understanding as a central component of the epistemic good. Recognizing the difference between knowledge and understanding and the role of both in the epistemic good leads to an expanded approach to understanding education and to defining the epistemic virtues, including OM. In this essay, I argue that reclaiming the value of understanding leads to an expanded account of OM, which is defined as a virtue motivated by love of both truth and understanding. With this fuller account of OM, many common worries about OM are avoided, and its value is more clearly explained. In the first section, I begin by briefly considering the relation between truth, knowledge, and understanding. Then, in the second section, I present an account of OM as a virtue in the pursuit of both understanding and knowledge. I situate my account of OM within the previous literature from both philosophy and philosophy of education, and I defend it against potential criticisms.