2007LegisprudenceRequires access

Limiting Clauses: On the Continental European Tradition of Special Limiting Clauses and the General Limiting Clause of Art 52(1) Charter of Fundamental Richts of the European Union

Martin Borowski

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Abstract

In the Continental European tradition, provisions granting fundamental rights frequently include a written limiting clause such as art 11(2) ECHR: “No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society ….” Instead of the traditional system of special limiting clauses, in which provisions granting rights include their own limiting clauses, one finds in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in art 52(1) a general limiting clause. The introduction of this provision is a welcome basis for analysing the nature of limiting clauses in general and the respects in which general limiting clauses differ from systems of written and unwritten special limiting clauses in particular. The formal requirement of limitation by law and the substantive requirement of proportionality prove to be the essential limiting criteria.

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What this paper is about

In the Continental European tradition, provisions granting fundamental rights frequently include a written limiting clause such as art 11(2) ECHR: “No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society ….” Instead of the traditional system of special limiting clauses, in which provisions granting rights include their own limiting clauses, one finds in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in art 52(1) a general limiting clause. The introduction of this provision is a welcome basis for analysing the nature of limiting clauses in general and the respects in which general limiting clauses differ from systems of written and unwritten special limiting clauses in particular. The formal requirement of limitation by law and the substantive requirement of proportionality prove to be the essential limiting criteria.

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Available abstract

In the Continental European tradition, provisions granting fundamental rights frequently include a written limiting clause such as art 11(2) ECHR: “No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society ….” Instead of the traditional system of special limiting clauses, in which provisions granting rights include their own limiting clauses, one finds in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in art 52(1) a general limiting clause. The introduction of this provision is a welcome basis for analysing the nature of limiting clauses in general and the respects in which general limiting clauses differ from systems of written and unwritten special limiting clauses in particular. The formal requirement of limitation by law and the substantive requirement of proportionality prove to be the essential limiting criteria.

Key concepts: Charter, Democracy, Limiting, Political science, Law, Law and economics, Fundamental rights, European union

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Limiting Clauses: On the Continental European Tradition of Special Limiting Clauses and the General Limiting Clause of Art 52(1) Charter of Fundamental Richts of the European Union — Research Paper | ScholarLens