A Military Analysis of the Battle of Shanghai, 13 August - 8 November 1937

Historians have treated the three-month battle of Shanghai, during the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, as a complete and sealed event. Many descriptions of the battle are incomplete in the manner in which they account for the eventual Chinese defeat. This paper seeks to probe tactical conditions of the battle more deeply and expand more fully upon the reasons why the battle unfolded as it did. The decision of the Chinese to make a stand at Shanghai was deliberate and measured. The opening moves of the battle did not surprise either side. It was strategic, rather than tactical error, along with unfavorable weather conditions that caused the failure of the Chinese offensive. While the number of combatants and the quality of their equipment were of great importance, enumeration and firepower alone can't explain why the Chinese defensive phase was so long. Instead, actual combat ratios together with a well-prepared defense acted with weather and terrain to slow the Japanese. The commitment of numerous combat forces and firepower could be interpreted as an effect of battle, not the cause of its outcome. Chinese soldiers were motivated for reasons other than nationalism. Leadership, discipline and organization were matched on both sides of the battlefield. The Japanese eventually won the battle not only because of superior technology and equipment against a broadly committed force (as is often acknowledged), but also because of mobility achieved through the successful landing at Huangchow. Tactical analysis allows us to revise historiographical interpretations and draw new historical conclusions.