2006Unpublished venueRequires access

Surface Engagement Groups: Bridging the Disconnect Between Today's Fleet and Tomorrow's Maritime Mission

John Kochendorfer

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Abstract

The United States Navy possesses the most capable and most powerful naval force in history. Today's Navy is a relic of the Cold War era, in which the force was built to fight and win a large blue-water naval conflict. While the Navy remains postured and capable of fighting a large, high intensity conflict at sea, it only now is gaining credible capability in the long forgotten green and brown water operating areas. The CNO Guidance of 2006 directs the Navy in a new direction; Tomorrow's Navy will be widely dispersed into numerous regions, establish partnerships with international forces through the "1,000 Ship Navy", gain regional and cultural familiarity, and be able to shape the operating environment to deter and defeat asymmetric and non-traditional threats. The Navy operates on the Carrier and Expeditionary Strike Group constructs. Strike Groups alone cannot sustain increased forward presence on the scale directed by the CNO. The Navy must reform its deployment and employment methods to match its fleet with its mission. By downsizing strike groups to their absolute essence and regrouping the remaining force into regionally focused Surface Engagement Groups, the Navy will be able to achieve the commander's intent in the 2006 CNO's Guidance.

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The United States Navy possesses the most capable and most powerful naval force in history. Today's Navy is a relic of the Cold War era, in which the force was built to fight and win a large blue-water naval conflict. While the Navy remains postured and capable of fighting a large, high intensity conflict at sea, it only now is gaining credible capability in the long forgotten green and brown water operating areas. The CNO Guidance of 2006 directs the Navy in a new direction; Tomorrow's Navy will be widely dispersed into numerous regions, establish partnerships with international forces through the "1,000 Ship Navy", gain regional and cultural familiarity, and be able to shape the operating environment to deter and defeat asymmetric and non-traditional threats. The Navy operates on the Carrier and Expeditionary Strike Group constructs. Strike Groups alone cannot sustain increased forward presence on the scale directed by the CNO. The Navy must reform its deployment and employment methods to match its fleet with its mission. By downsizing strike groups to their absolute essence and regrouping the remaining force into regionally focused Surface Engagement Groups, the Navy will be able to achieve the commander's intent in the 2006 CNO's Guidance.

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Available abstract

The United States Navy possesses the most capable and most powerful naval force in history. Today's Navy is a relic of the Cold War era, in which the force was built to fight and win a large blue-water naval conflict. While the Navy remains postured and capable of fighting a large, high intensity conflict at sea, it only now is gaining credible capability in the long forgotten green and brown water operating areas. The CNO Guidance of 2006 directs the Navy in a new direction; Tomorrow's Navy will be widely dispersed into numerous regions, establish partnerships with international forces through the "1,000 Ship Navy", gain regional and cultural familiarity, and be able to shape the operating environment to deter and defeat asymmetric and non-traditional threats. The Navy operates on the Carrier and Expeditionary Strike Group constructs. Strike Groups alone cannot sustain increased forward presence on the scale directed by the CNO. The Navy must reform its deployment and employment methods to match its fleet with its mission. By downsizing strike groups to their absolute essence and regrouping the remaining force into regionally focused Surface Engagement Groups, the Navy will be able to achieve the commander's intent in the 2006 CNO's Guidance.

Key concepts: Bridging (networking), Aeronautics, Engineering, Computer science, Computer security

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