Grandma, the GNP, and the Duty to Die

Earlier literature on the duty to die is meager but emphatically promotes such a duty. According to preceding chapters, this duty rests on two foundational principles: the beneficence principle of not burdening one’s loved ones and the justice principle of not consuming more than one’s share of scarce resources. Supporters of this duty argue that its implementation can be made at the level of public policy and/or at the family level. They also argue that attitudes concerning the duty to die can be made more acceptable through socialization, and that although this duty exists, it has been thus far unrecognized. Following their arguments closely, I explore the reasoning that supports the duty to die, whether the duty should be limited to the elderly or to the ill in general, the implications of recognizing duties not universally recognized, the notion of “value” that underlies the concept of “scarce resources,” and the consequences of implementing this duty. I raise questions about why the foundational principles of beneficence and justice do not entail other duties for persons in affluent societies, and whether this duty does not leave us with an idiosyncratic view of “duty” itself. I come to the conclusion that with all of its novelty, the ramifications of recognizing such a duty leave us in a strange moral situation indeed.