Do We Have a Duty to Die?

The claim that we might have a duty to die, particularly when we are old or very ill, seemed at first shocking and harsh. A set of hypothetical cases is examined to show that the claim is morally defensible under certain circumstances. A generic conception of moral duty is described. Two broad categories of moral reasons, those based on considerations of beneficence and those based on ideas about moral principles or virtues apart from beneficence, are studied. Both are shown to provide plausible foundations for the claim that in some situations a person has a duty to die. A summary of factors playing into the duty is given. Finally, practical difficulties that would arise from explicit recognition of the duty are examined along with theoretical complications. It is concluded that the problem, although it clearly causes discomfort, cannot be avoided. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.