The Precarious Sovereignty of Rights
Hugo Adam Bedau
Abstract
Hugo Adam Bedau
Abstract
This paper argues that the typical theory of human rights is both defective and misleading. It is misleading insofar as the rights that these theories generate are not the powerful moral swords and shields that their advocates take them to be. It is defective insofar as it fails to confront the chief sources of trouble for theories of rights. In sum, rights do not have the finality in human affairs that is often claimed for them.
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This paper argues that the typical theory of human rights is both defective and misleading. It is misleading insofar as the rights that these theories generate are not the powerful moral swords and shields that their advocates take them to be. It is defective insofar as it fails to confront the chief sources of trouble for theories of rights. In sum, rights do not have the finality in human affairs that is often claimed for them.
Key concepts: Sovereignty, Law, Political science, Law and economics, Environmental ethics, Philosophy, Sociology, Politics