The Effects of Soviet Army Communications Jamming on the AIM Division Signal Battalion.
John Williamson
Abstract
John Williamson
Abstract
This study attempts to show that the U.S. Army AIM division signal battalion cannot provide reliable communications support when confronted with the current Soviet radioelectronic combat threat. The investigation is centered on the fact that the division maneuver commanders are not familiar with the difficulties and complexities of the communications-electronics mission in an electronic warfare environment and currently rely too heavily on electronic communications to maintain command and control on the battlefield. The AIM division signal battalion mission and its current radio systems are explained in detail. The doctrine, equipment, and known capabilities of the Soviet communications jamming organizations are examined. Recent computer based technical analyses of the effectiveness of the Soviet radioelectronic combat threat on division level communications is presented. The author concludes that current AIM division signal battalions would not be able to maintain reliable command and control communications systems on the modern electronic battlefield when confronted with the full effects of the Soviet radioelectronic combat threat.
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This study attempts to show that the U.S. Army AIM division signal battalion cannot provide reliable communications support when confronted with the current Soviet radioelectronic combat threat. The investigation is centered on the fact that the division maneuver commanders are not familiar with the difficulties and complexities of the communications-electronics mission in an electronic warfare environment and currently rely too heavily on electronic communications to maintain command and control on the battlefield. The AIM division signal battalion mission and its current radio systems are explained in detail. The doctrine, equipment, and known capabilities of the Soviet communications jamming organizations are examined. Recent computer based technical analyses of the effectiveness of the Soviet radioelectronic combat threat on division level communications is presented. The author concludes that current AIM division signal battalions would not be able to maintain reliable command and control communications systems on the modern electronic battlefield when confronted with the full effects of the Soviet radioelectronic combat threat.
Key concepts: Electronic warfare, Tactical communications, Military communications, Command and control, Division (mathematics), Jamming, Doctrine, Telecommunications