Epilogue
Charles Goodhart
Abstract
Charles Goodhart
Abstract
This book was set in motion in 2004, and most of the background research, and even the writing, was done in 2006 and 2007. The reason that it has taken so long to reach publication is that the process was then drastically interrupted by the financial crisis starting in August 2007. This crisis has been severe and prolonged. It has, of course, centred on the working of the monetary, banking and financial systems. So economists (even older, retired ones) who had focussed on money and banking issues, especially those relating to financial regulation, suddenly found themselves in current demand, to explain events, to predict developments and to propose remedies. In the face of such immediacy, history had to wait. Among the many questions that the crisis raised, a key question was why the apparatus of financial regulation then failed to prevent a systemic failure. In order to understand how that occurred, it is, I believe, desirable, perhaps necessary, to have a sufficient understanding of how such financial regulation developed over time, its ethos and purpose, its strengths and weaknesses. So at the same time as the financial crisis significantly delayed the appearance of this book, it has also underlined its importance in the wider scheme of things.
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This book was set in motion in 2004, and most of the background research, and even the writing, was done in 2006 and 2007. The reason that it has taken so long to reach publication is that the process was then drastically interrupted by the financial crisis starting in August 2007. This crisis has been severe and prolonged. It has, of course, centred on the working of the monetary, banking and financial systems. So economists (even older, retired ones) who had focussed on money and banking issues, especially those relating to financial regulation, suddenly found themselves in current demand, to explain events, to predict developments and to propose remedies. In the face of such immediacy, history had to wait. Among the many questions that the crisis raised, a key question was why the apparatus of financial regulation then failed to prevent a systemic failure. In order to understand how that occurred, it is, I believe, desirable, perhaps necessary, to have a sufficient understanding of how such financial regulation developed over time, its ethos and purpose, its strengths and weaknesses. So at the same time as the financial crisis significantly delayed the appearance of this book, it has also underlined its importance in the wider scheme of things.
Key concepts: Immediacy, Financial crisis, Face (sociological concept), Economics, Financial system, Business, Keynesian economics, Sociology