A Model of Competition with Environmental Taxes and Regulation Under Conditions of Oligopoly
XIAOJiang-wen, LUOYun-fengtffu
Abstract
XIAOJiang-wen, LUOYun-fengtffu
Abstract
The Cournot static game with complete information is reviewed. A model of competition with environmental taxes under conditions of oligopoly is built based on the Cournot game, and some helpful conclusions are drawn from the model. A game model with regulation of government is also established.Finally the optimization problem of market structure is discussed.
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The Cournot static game with complete information is reviewed. A model of competition with environmental taxes under conditions of oligopoly is built based on the Cournot game, and some helpful conclusions are drawn from the model. A game model with regulation of government is also established.Finally the optimization problem of market structure is discussed.
Key concepts: Cournot competition, Oligopoly, Economics, Competition (biology), Microeconomics, Market structure, Government (linguistics), Complete information