Professor David D. Siegel: Amicus Curiae-A Special Relationship with the Court of Appeals

It was Saturday, December 29, 1984. The Court of Appeals convened in a special session to address a constitutional question that went to very heart of New York's judicial system. A trial court in New York had ruled that mandatory retirement provisions of state law for state-court judges (requiring retirement at age seventy) abridged due process and equal protection clauses of Federal Constitution. The appeal had to be finally decided by Court of Appeals before midnight on December 31, 1984, at which time newly-elected judges were scheduled to assume office. Senior Associate Judge Matthew J. Jasen--for whom I was a law clerk in 1984 and 1985--was acting Chief Judge, and we traveled from Buffalo to Albany for special session. After oral argument and consultation with judges of court, Judge Jasen endeavored to draft an opinion for The court confronted several questions including whether state law violated equal protection clause by permitting justices of supreme court to receive (which would allow those justices to serve until age of seventy-six) while denying same opportunity for certification to undeniably accomplished judges serving on other courts such as civil court, criminal court, county court, surrogate's court and court of claims. As is evident from court's opinion, Judge Jasen put policy considerations underlying state law to one side and considered whether there was a rational basis for law's distinctions. As court's opinion shows, answer was found in Professor Siegel's authoritative treatise on New York Practice. In a unanimous opinion that was handed down on New Year's Eve, Judge Jasen stated: Mindful of State-wide reach of Supreme Court jurisdiction, absence of maximum monetary limitations upon invocation of Supreme Court jurisdiction, and conferral of jurisdiction over certain simple or specialized matters upon other courts, complexity of Supreme Court matters may rationally be deemed to require greater experience and manpower than are necessary in other courts. Where, as here, significant reasons of fiscal concern and proper administration of courts exist, or could conceivably exist, to justify distinctions between judicial offices, lack of mathematical symmetry within unified court system shall be disregarded. (1) This is a perfect exemplar of special relationship that Professor Siegel had with New York Court of Appeals. Under unusual time constraints, Judge Jasen turned to a trusted and reliable partner in shared mission of development of law of New York--David D. Siegel--in deciding a question of constitutional and state--wide importance. (2) Professor Siegel's writings have transcended procedure and influenced substantive merits of cases. For example, in Pludeman v. Northern Leasing Systems, Inc., (3) Court of Appeals addressed issue of whether plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded a cause of action for fraud against individually-named corporate defendants under CPLR 3016(b) which provides that in fraud cases, the circumstances constituting wrong shall be stated in detail. (4) In an opinion by Judge Theodore T. Jones, court ruled that complaint was sufficient and concrete facts 'are peculiarly within knowledge of party' charged with fraud, it would work a potentially unnecessary injustice to dismiss a case at an early stage where any pleading deficiency might be cured later in proceedings. (5) In reaching this conclusion, court quoted Professor Siegel's real-world observation that [m]isrepresenters have not been known to keep elaborate diaries of their fraud for use of defrauded in court. (6) In light of these considerations, court declined to adopt a pleading standard under CPLR 3016(b) that would have closed courthouse to potentially meritorious causes of action. …