Juvenile Justice's Second Chance: Untangling the Retroactive Application of Miller v. Alabama under the Teague Doctrine

Over the last decade, the Supreme Court pieced together a clear doctrine related to sentencing juvenile offenders transferred to adult criminal courts: convicted persons eighteen years of age or younger may not receive the death penalty, may not receive life without parole for nonhomicide offenses, and may not be sentenced under mandatory life without parole statutes. The prohibition against mandatory life without parole sentences came about through Miller v. Alabama, the most recent Supreme Court holding on juvenile sentencing practices, which requires an individualized hearing to consider mitigating factors. Whereas the Court's conclusions interpreting the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment clause seem straightforward, whether to retroactively apply Miller v. Alabama has proven challenging. State supreme courts and legislatures accept the ruling's prospective impact, but waver on its effect for inmates seeking habeas relief. Two years after the Court's opinion, the tally includes state courts choosing to resentence those unconstitutionally punished to life without parole as juveniles and state courts choosing to not reopen these cases.