Independent Orbiter Assessment: Assessment of the FMEA/CIL Instructions and Ground Rules

The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company was selected to conduct an independent assessment of the Orbiter Failure Mode and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL). Part of this effort involved an examination of the FMEA/CIL preparation instructions and ground rules. Assessment objectives were to identify omissions and ambiguities in the ground rules that may impede the identification of shuttle orbiter safety and mission critical items, and to ensure that ground rules allow these items to receive proper management visibility for risk assessment. Assessment objectives were followed during the performance of the assessment without being influenced by external considerations such as effects on budget, schedule, and documentation growth. Assessment personnel were employed who had a strong reliability background but no previous space shuttle FMEA/CIL experience to ensure an independent assessment would be achieved. The following observations were made: (1) not all essential items are in the CIL for management visibility; (2) ground rules omit FMEA/CIL coverage of items that perform critical functions; (3) essential items excluded from the CIL do not receive design justification; and (4) FMEAs/CILs are not updated in a timely manner. In addition to the above issues, a number of other issues were identified that correct FMEA/CIL preparation instruction omissions and clarify ambiguities. The assessment was successful in that many of the issues have significant safety implications.