Irregular Warfare -- Perhaps Not So "Irregular"

The purpose of this paper is to provide a clearer understanding of what is currently being characterized by the Department of Defense (DoD) as "irregular warfare." The context of this assessment is taken through the lens of existing literature and draft documentation coupled with the application of historical references and perspectives to support the argument that this new form of warfare is not so irregular. Since the horrific terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, senior civilian and military leaders have acknowledged a national need to effect fundamental change to improve effectiveness in defeating irregular challenges. This paper reviews national policy and the myriad of DoD efforts and other subject matter expert working groups that have taken on the monumental task of framing an irregular warfare environment. Next, an assessment of these efforts reveals a remarkable similarity of operations and activities used to describe this new warfighting environment to those defined through history. Coincidentally, these are the same operations and activities outlined in existing doctrine that the U.S. military actively employs in operations today. At the conclusion of this paper, recommendations are provided to help focus understanding and further promulgation of the term "irregular warfare" should it continue to gain momentum.