Design and Implementation of an Unused Ports-based Decoy System to Redirect Hackers toward Honeypots
Iksu Kim, Myung Ho Kim
Abstract
Iksu Kim, Myung Ho Kim
Abstract
Many computer security systems use the signatures of well-known attacks to respond to hackers. For these systems, it is very important to get the accurate signatures of new attacks as soon as possible. For this reason, honeypots and honeypot farms have been actively researched. However, they can only collect a small amount of information because hackers have a strong tendency to directly attack servers of which IP addresses are allocated. In this paper, we propose an unused ports-based decoy system to redirect hackers toward honeypots. This system opens unused ports to lure hackers. All interactions with the unused ports are considered as suspect, because the ports aren't those for real service. Accordingly, every request sent to the unused ports is redirected to a honeypot. Consequently, this system enables honeypots to collect information about hackers attacking real servers other than themselves.
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Many computer security systems use the signatures of well-known attacks to respond to hackers. For these systems, it is very important to get the accurate signatures of new attacks as soon as possible. For this reason, honeypots and honeypot farms have been actively researched. However, they can only collect a small amount of information because hackers have a strong tendency to directly attack servers of which IP addresses are allocated. In this paper, we propose an unused ports-based decoy system to redirect hackers toward honeypots. This system opens unused ports to lure hackers. All interactions with the unused ports are considered as suspect, because the ports aren't those for real service. Accordingly, every request sent to the unused ports is redirected to a honeypot. Consequently, this system enables honeypots to collect information about hackers attacking real servers other than themselves.
Key concepts: Honeypot, Hacker, Computer security, Server, Computer science, Decoy, Operating system, Chemistry