The 2006 Lebanon War: Lessons Learned

T o critics of airpower, Israel's 2006 war with Hizballah exposed the fal- lacy that targeting centers of gravity, such as population, command and control, and infrastructure could coerce the adversary into surrendering, and that airpower could obviate the need for land forces and independently win wars.Given Israel's unexpected challenges in waging the Lebanon war, airpower and then Chief of Staff Dan Halutz, seen as the overzealous proponent of airpower, became easy targets in after-action reports, criticism that ultimately led to Halutz's resignation and replacement by Gaby Ashkenazi, a former infantry commander. 1But does the Lebanon war warrant a swing of the strategic pendulum back towards favoring ground forces?What contributed to Israel's unprecedented military challenges in confronting Hizballah?What are the appropriate strategic lessons to glean from the summer 2006 war in Lebanon?In examining the Lebanon campaign, this article highlights three weaknesses in the Israeli strategy.First, the Israeli leadership's faith in airpower as an antiseptic, low-casualty answer for modern warfare clouded the possibility of other strategies that may have been more effective in achieving its objectives.Second, the leadership suffered from the classic "fighting the last war" mentality, internalizing the lessons from a military campaignnamely Kosovo-in which airpower was successful and applying it to an incongruous environment.Third, airpower was ultimately counterproductive against an asymmetric adversary such as Hizballah.By launching mobile katyusha rockets from holy sites and schools, Hizballah virtually ensured that Israel would inflict civilian casualties; through its strategic use of the media, 72Parameters